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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Massachusetts enacted a law banning the state government 
from conducting business with companies associated with the country of 
Burma.1  The law took aim at Burma based on the country’s human rights 
 * Ryan McGlynn is a J.D. candidate, May 2014, Nova Southeastern University, She-
pard Broad Law Center.  Ryan earned a B.A. in political science from Furman University in 
Greenville, South Carolina.  Ryan would like to thank his family, friends, and teachers for 
their guidance and support.   Ryan also extends a special thanks to the members of Nova Law 
Review for their time and effort in preparing this article for publication.
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violations and forced labor issues.2  Less than five years after its enactment, 
the Supreme Court of the United States found the law unconstitutional, as it 
violated the Supremacy Clause.3  Namely, the Court found the law unconsti-
tutional because of congressional intent to grant the President “discretion . . . 
to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy” in dealing with the gov-
ernment of Burma.4
In 2012, Governor of Florida, Rick Scott, signed a bill amending a law 
very similar to the Burma law in Massachusetts, but instead taking aim at the 
nation of Cuba.5  Florida’s Cuba Amendment (“Cuba Amendment”) remains 
very controversial and generated international scrutiny even before it was 
passed.6  The Cuba Amendment has similar provisions to the Massachusetts 
Burma Law (“Massachusetts law”) and “prohibits the State of Florida from 
awarding public contracts in excess of one million dollars to companies who 
have ‘business operations’ in Cuba.”7  “‘Business operations’ [are] defined 
as ‘engaging in commerce in any form . . . .’”8  A Brazilian construction 
conglomerate with billions of dollars hinging on the legal fate of the Cuba 
Amendment has already filed suit in federal court.9  A federal judge has is-
sued a preliminary injunction against the law being enforced, allowing Ode-
brecht Construction, Inc. (“Odebrecht”) to resume work on projects in Mi-
 1. Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 239–41, (codified at MASS.
GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22 G–7:22 M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 2. HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CENTER, DEFENDING THE 
MASSACHUSETTS BURMA LAW 3 (2000). 
 3. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 4. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. 
 5. FLA. STAT. § 287.135 (2012); Marc Caputo & Patricia Mazzei, Fla. Gov. Rick Scott 
Signs Cuba-Crackdown Bill, but Event Turns into a Public Relations Fiasco, MIAMI HERALD,
May 1, 2012, http://www .miamiherald.com/2012/05/01/v-print/2777969/fla-gov-rick-scott-
signs-cuba.html. 
 6. See Patricia Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash If Gov. Scott Signs 
New Anti-Cuba Legislation, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 2012, http://www.miamiherald. 
com/2012/04/21/v-print/2762957/flas-trading-partners-warn-of.html [hereinafter Mazzei, 
Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash]. 
 7. Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012).  Compare FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2), with Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 
130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 239–41 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22 G–7:22 M, 40 F 
1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363 (2000). 
 8. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 287.135(b)). 
 9. Id. at *1; Patricia Mazzei, Odebrecht Sues Florida over New Law Banning Govern-
ment Hiring of Firms Tied to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2012, http://www.miamiherald. 
com/2012/06/04/v-print/2832880/odebrecht-sues-florida-over-new.html. 
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ami.10  The Cuba Amendment implicates many of the same constitutional 
problems that afflicted the Massachusetts law, and the federal court issuing 
the injunction has expressed serious doubts as to the Florida law’s validity.11
The Cuba Amendment is not universally opposed, however, seeing that 
the law was approved by an almost unanimous majority of Florida’s Legisla-
ture and also received support from many Cuban-American lawmakers in 
Miami-Dade County,12 perhaps a sign of the almost fifty-year strife between 
the many Cuban exiles in Florida and Communist Cuba.  Florida has a histo-
ry of antagonism toward the rogue island nation, and has tried to enforce 
legislation like the Cuba Amendment in the past.13  However, courts in Flori-
da have refused to uphold many of the anti-Cuba laws regardless of the polit-
ical sensitivity surrounding the issue in the Sunshine State.14  The Cuba 
Amendment seems to be headed in the same direction. 
This article will first discuss the Massachusetts law, including an analy-
sis of the constitutional issues raised and the Supreme Court’s ruling.15  The 
second section will provide a brief history of Florida’s relationship with Cu-
ba regarding various anti-Cuba laws and bills from Florida.16  This section 
will also note several federal laws directed at the nation of Cuba.17  The final 
section will focus on the recently signed Cuba Amendment and any constitu-
tional issues that go with it.18  This section will also discuss recent litigation 
in federal court concerning the Cuba Amendment, compare and contrast the 
Massachusetts law with the Cuba Amendment, as well as discuss the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court decision that found the Massachusetts law uncons-
titutional.19  This discussion will be in an attempt to predict a result, should 
 10. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *1; Patricia Mazzei, Miami Federal 
Judge Blocks New Florida Anti-Cuba Law from Taking Effect, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 2012, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/25/v-print/2867901/miami-federal-judge-blocks-new. 
html [hereinafter Mazzei, Miami Federal Judge Blocks New Florida Anti-Cuba Law]. 
 11. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366, 371 (2000), aff’g Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 
WL 2524261, at *5, *9, *12; see also U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 
2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 12. See Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash if Gov. Scott Signs New Anti-
Cuba Legislation, supra note 6; see also Caputo & Mazzei, supra note 5. 
 13. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 n.3, *3; see also Cuban Assets 
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208 (2011). 
 14. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 & n.3 (citing Miami Light Project 
v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176–77 (S.D. Fla. 2000)). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 17. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
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the Cuba Amendment ascend to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and 
ultimately to the Supreme Court. 
II. MASSACHUSETTS AND BURMA (MYANMAR)
Massachusetts has a history of economic boycotts.20  During the Ameri-
can Revolution, the colony of Massachusetts played a key role in “sup-
port[ing] the boycott of British goods.”21  Burma—which also gained its in-
dependence from Great Britain—maintained a parliamentary democracy 
from 1948 until 1962.22  From 1962 to 1988, the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party controlled the country and violence against demonstrators in the late 
1980s continued into the 1990s.23  Massachusetts, and about twenty-two oth-
er states, enacted similar legislation.24  Although the Massachusetts law was 
the only one to make it to the Supreme Court, its invalidation by the Court 
meant the same for all similar state laws relating to Burma at the time.25
A. The Massachusetts Law  
1. History 
Despite being found unconstitutional, the Massachusetts law was not 
without good cause, seeing that Burma’s violations of human rights and sys-
tematic political oppression were especially egregious during the late twen-
tieth century.26  According to one study, “forced labor account[ed] for [seven 
percent] of [the country]’s economy” and almost six million people were 
forced to work against their will during the 1990s.27  Burma’s military also 
engaged in the practice of portering, whereby porters were required to ad-
vance ahead of soldiers in an attempt to detonate land mines or shield sol-
diers from enemy fire.28  Millions were also relocated against their will and 
put in concentration camps where conditions were abysmal.29
 20. See HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, supra note 2, at 2. 
 21. Id.
 22. Adrienne S. Khorasanee, Note, Sacrificing Burma to Save Free Trade:  The Burma 
Freedom Act and the World Trade Organization, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1298 (2002). 
 23. Id. at 1298–1300. 
 24. Id. at 1295–96. 
 25. Id. at 1296. 
 26. See id. at 1296, 1299–1300. 
 27. HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, supra note 2, at 3. 
 28. Id.
 29. Id.
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The call for states and governments to take action came initially from 
within Burma when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a political activist and winner 
of the Nobel Peace Prize, encouraged bans on economic investment in the 
country.30  Suu Kyi famously said, in 1996, “[p]rofits from business enter-
prises will merely go towards enriching a small, already very privileged elite.  
Companies [that trade in Burma] only serve to prolong the agony of my 
country by encouraging the present military regime to persevere in its intran-
sigence.”31  The Massachusetts Legislature decided to heed this calling.32
2. Implementation and Federal Competition 
Initially, the anti-Burma law was successful in that it seemed to effec-
tively draw American companies away from the troubled country.33  Broadly 
stated, the Massachusetts law “generally bar[red] state entities from buying 
goods or services from any person—defined to include a business organiza-
tion—identified on a ‘restricted purchase list’ of those doing business with 
Burma.”34  The restricted purchase list had about 346 companies by the time 
the initial lawsuit was filed.35  The law made exceptions for persons or busi-
nesses in Burma related to the press, suppliers of telecommunications goods, 
and medical or health suppliers.36  Under the law, all state contracts were 
void if entered into with a company listed as having contact with Burma.37
The law applied to “companies already in Burma” as well as “existing con-
tracts or contracts that may be renewed.”38
The same year the Massachusetts law was passed, Congress enacted a 
federal statute that looked very similar.39  The many overlaps between the 
two laws were largely responsible for the Massachusetts law being found 
 30. See Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1299–1300. 
 31. HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, supra note 2, at 3. 
 32. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1300. 
 33. Id. at 1301. 
 34. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000) (citing Act of June 
25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 241–42 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–
7:22M, 40 F1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363 (2000)), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
 35. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1301. 
 36. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367 (citing Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 241–42). 
 37. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1301; see also Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 242. 
 38. Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 243; Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303. 
 39. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1302; see also Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-166 to 3009-167 (1997); Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 243. 
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unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.40  The federal statute “re-
stricted aid to the government of Burma, . . . required federal representatives 
of ‘international financial institutions’ to vote against proposed financial 
assistance to Burma, . . . prohibited the issuance of visas to Burmese gov-
ernment officials, . . . [and] gave discretion to the Executive Office in deter-
mining when the sanctions may be lifted.”41  The main difference between 
the federal statute and the Massachusetts law was that the federal statute 
primarily targeted new money going to Burma and not necessarily contracts 
in effect at the time.42  The federal statute took on “a more political [and] less 
economic”43 tone, directing the President to “develop ‘a comprehensive, mul-
tilateral strategy to . . . improve human rights . . . in Burma.’”44  The Presi-
dent was also to work with neighboring countries and groups such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to work towards a 
solution.45  This federal law would become the topic of several lawsuits 
brought against Massachusetts on constitutional grounds.46
B. Court Decisions 
The Massachusetts state law resulted in a series of court opinions, start-
ing in federal court in Massachusetts and ending in the Supreme Court.47
The following section will provide a general discussion of these cases. 
1. United States District Court, District of Massachusetts 
The legal action against the Massachusetts law occurred in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.48  The suit started 
when the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) sued the two state offi-
 40. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.  Compare § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to 3009-167, 
with Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 239–43. 
 41. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1302; see also § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to 
3009-167. 
 42. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303.  Compare § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to 
3009-167, with Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 243. 
 43. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303. 
 44. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369 (quoting § 570(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-166). 
 45. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303. 
 46. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366; Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 
38, 44–45 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 47. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45; Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. 
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council v. Natsios, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 48. See Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289. 
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cials charged with administering the Massachusetts law at issue,49 however, 
this article will refer to the defendant as the State of Massachusetts.  In its 
opinion, the court noted that there were amicus briefs filed in support of the 
NFTC that came from around the world.50
Initially, Massachusetts defended the law on the basis that a state can 
intrude into foreign affairs, so long as the result is indirect.51  Massachusetts 
also argued that the law did not create 
a direct contact between the state and the Nation of Myanmar [and 
that] important state interests embodied in the First and Tenth 
Amendments justify the statute; and . . . the foreign affairs’ doc-
trine is itself “vague,” [and therefore] the court should leave to the 
legislative branch the issue of whether to invalidate the Massachu-
setts . . . [l]aw and similar state procurement statutes.52
While trying to analogize the Massachusetts law with other state statutes that 
were sustained, the state cited case law from federal courts that held in that 
manner.53  However, the district court distinguished these cases in that the 
statutes involved, unlike the Massachusetts law, “did not single out a particu-
lar foreign country for particular treatment.”54  The district court also noted 
that not all “Buy American” statutes are necessarily constitutional.55
The court acknowledged that the Massachusetts law did not fashion any 
direct contact with Burma, but that this was irrelevant for purposes of the 
law’s constitutionality.56  Referring to the Supreme Court of the United 
 49. Id.
 50. Id. at 291. 
 51. Id.
 52. Id.
 53. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291.  Massachusetts cited cases from several United States 
district courts upholding state statutes, such as one requiring that the state governments pur-
chase products made in the United States for construction, another requiring a city to cease 
investing in South Africa, as well as other “Buy American” statutes.  Id. at 291–92 (citing 
Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 742 F. Supp. 900, 901, 903 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Bd. of Trs. 
of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 723, 757 (Md. 1989); 
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 789
(N.J. 1977)). 
 54. Id. at 292. 
55. Id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Dep’t of the Water & Power, 
80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802–03 (Ct. App. 1969)).  “Buy American” statutes are laws usually requir-
ing that states only purchase materials originating or produced in the United States or that 
states only contract with companies that purchase and use United States materials.  See id.
 56. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434–35 
(1968)).
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States’ decision in Zschernig v. Miller57—also cited in the most recent opi-
nion regarding Florida’s Cuba Amendment mentioned later58—the district 
court explained that only a substantive impact is necessary.59  The court also 
stated the principle that the nobility of the state law bears no effect on for-
eign affairs infringement analysis.60
The NFTC also argued that the Massachusetts law was preempted and 
violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.61  However, the district court refused 
to address either of these issues directly, as neither would have any conse-
quential effect on the court’s ultimate decision.62  The district court did note 
that in order for a state law to be preempted by federal legislation, there must 
be intent on behalf of Congress to regulate in the area that the state law af-
fects.63  The court only stated that because the NFTC argued that Congress 
impliedly intended to exercise its authority in the area, the NFTC had a high-
er burden than if arguing express preemption.64  The court also refused to 
address the Foreign Commerce Clause issue and the possible market partici-
pant exception, and finally held that the law was unconstitutional because of 
its “infringement [on the] federal government’s . . . foreign affairs” authori-
ty.65
2. First Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,66 the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to hold for the law’s chal-
lengers.67  The NFTC—the plaintiff nonprofit organization comprised of 
companies involved in international business—filed suit in the federal trial 
court of Massachusetts and was granted summary judgment in its initial suit 
against Massachusetts.68
 57. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 58. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at 
*7–8 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). 
 59. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434). 
 60. Id. (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1942); United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)). 
 61. Id. at 293; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 
441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). 
 62. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
 63. Id. (citing Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
 64. Id. at 293 (citing Philip Morris Inc., 122 F.3d at 79). 
 65. Id.
 66. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 67. Id. at 45, 78; see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371
(2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 68. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 48–49. 
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Upon granting review, the First Circuit first analyzed the Massachusetts 
law and its constitutionality under the federal government’s foreign affairs 
power,69 which was the basis for the lower federal court finding for the 
NFTC.70  The court rejected many of the state’s arguments, including that the 
First and Tenth Amendments protected the law.71  Generally, the court found 
that foreign affairs are to be handled by the federal government and that the 
Massachusetts Burma law was in violation of this principle of federalism.72
Namely, that the state law crossed a line into what should be the federal gov-
ernment’s jurisdiction of power by passing a law dealing with a foreign 
country in that the state law had more than an “‘incidental or indirect effect 
in [that] foreign countr[y].’”73
The second area of the court’s focus was on Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power.74  The court rejected the state’s argument that the Burma law 
was a constitutional exercise of power under the market participant exception 
of the Commerce Clause.75  The First Circuit reasoned that the state was re-
gulating because it was “impos[ing] on companies with which it does busi-
ness conditions that appl[ied] to activities not even remotely connected to 
such companies’ interactions with Massachusetts.”76  The court also refused 
to rule that the market participant exception even applied to the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue.77
The third and final analysis dealt with whether the Massachusetts law 
was preempted by the federal statute.78  The court rejected the argument that 
the law was impliedly authorized and not preempted simply because Con-
gress knew of the state law and never specifically preempted it.79  Instead, 
the court found that federal sanctions preempted the state law.80
 69. Id. at 50–52 (construing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)). 
 70. Id. at 51 (quoting Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291); see also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–
35. 
 71. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 60–61. 
 72. Id. at 49, 77 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)). 
 73. Id. at 52 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)). 
 74. Id. at 61; see Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371 (2000), aff’g
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 75. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 62; see also White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460
U.S. 204, 214–15 (1983) (holding that when a state spends its own money while acting as a 
participant in the market the Commerce Clause is not violated). 
 76. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63. 
 77. Id. at 65. 
 78. See id. at 71. 
 79. Id.
 80. Id. at 77. 
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 Preemption will be more easily found where states legislate in 
areas traditionally reserved to the federal government, and in par-
ticular where state laws touch on foreign affairs.  The test which 
should be applied is set forth in Hines . . . [holding] that “[n]o state 
can add to or take from the force and effect of [a] treaty or sta-
tute.”81
Therefore, because Massachusetts enacted a law regulating trade with Burma 
at the same time that federal sanctions did the same, but to a lesser extent, the 
state law was preempted.82  Perhaps, what is most notable about the First 
Circuit’s decision is its breadth, when compared to the narrow district court 
and later Supreme Court decisions.83  Ultimately, the court refused to uphold 
the law under the principle that it was the federal government’s, and not 
Massachusetts’s job to dictate the nation’s foreign policy agenda.84
3. Supreme Court of the United States Decision 
In 2000, the Massachusetts law advanced to the Supreme Court in 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,85 where the Court unanimously 
held to strike it down.86  Massachusetts appealed the First Circuit’s decision 
on the three grounds the court considered.87  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to clarify legal issues afflicting several other states as well.88
Justice David Souter began his opinion by stating a maxim of American 
constitutionalism:  “Congress has the power to preempt state law.  Even 
without an express provision for preemption, we have found that state law 
must yield to a congressional [a]ct . . . .”89  Justice Souter continued by not-
ing that this primarily occurs when Congress intends to “occupy the field” or 
when it is impossible for actors to comply with a federal statute and a state 
 81. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 73 (alterations in original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 63 (1941)). 
 82. Id. at 75. 
 83. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000), aff’g Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); Natsios, 181 F.3d at 77; Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998), cert. granted sub 
nom. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 84. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 77. 
 85. 530 U.S. 363 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
 86. Id. at 371–72, 388. 
 87. Id. at 371. 
 88. Id. at 371–72. 
 89. Id. at 372 (citations omitted). 
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law concurrently.90 With the Massachusetts law in place, a barrier was 
placed before the federal government and its goals.91  In fact, the Court’s 
decision to strike down the Massachusetts law rested solely on the basis that 
the state law was preempted.92  Specifically, the Massachusetts law adversely 
affected the President’s discretion, went further in its terms than the federal 
law, and contrasted with Congress’s intent for the President to be diplomatic 
in dealing with Burma.93
Justice Souter first analyzed the degree of discretion that the federal law 
afforded the President.94  The federal law gave the President broad discretion 
to end any United States sanctions on Burma if and when human rights and 
political reforms took place there.95  Most importantly in this regard, the 
Court noted Congress’s intent that the President may “waive, temporarily or 
permanently, any sanction.”96  The principle that the President has the most 
latitude to maneuver when Congress explicitly authorizes his actions has 
been firmly established by the Court.97  By way of the federal law, Congress 
gave the President the “authority not merely to make a political statement but 
to achieve a political result, and the fullness of his authority shows the im-
portance in the congressional mind of reaching that result.”98  The Massachu-
setts law would act as a roadblock by implementing state sanctions against 
Burma, different from those imposed by the federal government.99  Perhaps 
most notably, the Massachusetts law did not provide for a termination provi-
sion unlike the federal law.100  Therefore, enforcement of the Massachusetts 
law would effectively diminish the President’s discretion as intended by 
Congress.101
 90. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372–73 (citing California v. Arc Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101
(1989); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)). 
 91. See Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1307. 
 92. Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, International Decisions:  Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 750–51 (2000). 
 93. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–74; Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 752. 
 94. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374; see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(a), (e), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 to 
3009-167 (1997). 
 95. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374; see § 570(a), (e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to 3009-167. 
 96. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 (quoting § 570(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-167). 
 97. Id. at 375 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 98. Id. at 376. 
99. See id. Compare Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 241 (codified 
at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–7:22M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby 
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), with § 570(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-166.
 100. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376–77 (citing Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 242). 
 101. Id. at 377. 
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Next, the Court focused on the conflicting scopes of the two laws.102
Justice Souter noted that the federal law was limited to “United States per-
sons, . . . immediate sanctions, . . . [only] ‘new investment’ . . . and [did not 
apply to] . . . contracts to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology.”103
On the contrary, the Massachusetts law applied to “individuals and conduct 
that Congress . . . [specifically] exempted or excluded from sanctions.”104
However, it should be noted that the Massachusetts law operated by employ-
ing indirect economic sanctions through limiting business contracts while the 
federal law’s implementation was more direct by way of the executive.105
Justice Souter noted not only that the Massachusetts law was broader than 
the federal law, but also emphasized how broad in fact it was, seeing that 
foreign companies would be subjected to the Massachusetts law’s provi-
sions.106  Because of the Massachusetts law’s broad provisions and the inabil-
ity for many entities to comply with the federal law at the same time, the 
federal law preempted the Massachusetts law.107
Lastly, the Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law was preempted 
by federal legislation because of its effect on “the President’s capacity . . . for 
effective diplomacy.”108  Congress not only intended that the President have 
discretion in dealing with Burma, but also that he act as the sole representa-
tive of the United States on the world stage in dealing with Burma.109  No-
where is there evidence that Congress intended that the President’s voice be 
“obscured by state or local action.”110  The President’s inability to work un-
disturbed with other countries was evidenced when many United States allies 
formally protested the Massachusetts law.111
 102. See id. at 377–78. 
 103. Id. at 377 (citations omitted) (quoting Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(f)(2), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
167 (1997)). 
 104. Id. at 378. 
 105. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 378; see Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 241. 
 106. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379; Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 239–241; § 570(b), (f)(2), 110
Stat. at 3009-166 to 3009-167. 
 107. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366, 388. 
 108. Id. at 381. 
 109. See id. at 380–81 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). 
 110. Id. at 381. 
 111. Id. at 382 (citing Brief for the European Communities and Their Member States et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *4, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363 (2000), 2000 WL 177175). 
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The most notable of these were the European Union (EU), members of 
ASEAN, and Japan.112  Japan and the EU also filed formal complaints with 
the World Trade Organization, although these complaints were dropped after 
action in the United States District Court.113  Actions taken by these allies 
made it clear that the Massachusetts law could not exist side by side with the 
Federal Act.114  “In this case, repeated representations by the Executive 
Branch supported by formal diplomatic protests and concrete disputes are 
more than sufficient to demonstrate that the state Act stands in the way of 
Congress’s diplomatic objectives.”115  In his conclusion, Justice Souter noted 
that failure to expressly state that a federal law is preempting state law does 
not mean that preemption cannot be implied.116
It has been noted that the Court’s opinion was very narrow, especially 
in comparison to the district court’s opinion.117  The fact that the opinion can 
be read so narrowly has led some to argue that states are free to enact legisla-
tion similar to the Massachusetts law so long as there is no congressional act 
imposing similar or competing sanctions.118  It has also been said that the 
Crosby decision is unlikely to prevent other states from passing similar 
laws,119 and the recent amendment in the State of Florida is evidence of this 
proposition.120
III. FLORIDA
A. Florida and Cuba 
Florida and the nation of Cuba have had a contentious relationship evi-
denced by the Florida Legislature’s zeal for enacting many laws affecting 
 112. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382 (citing Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 
47 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999)).
 113. Id. at 383 & n.19; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 47. 
 114. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 383 (citing Brief for the European Communities and Their 
Member States et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 111, at *7). 
 115. Id. at 386. 
 116. Id. at 387–88 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–68 (1941)). 
 117. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 753.  Compare Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387–88, 
with Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing 
Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1997)), cert. granted sub nom. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 118. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 754; see Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 
MASS. ACTS 239, 239–43 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–7:22M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)), 
declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 119. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 754; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371–72. 
 120. See FLA. STAT. § 287.135 (2012); see also Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-
cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). 
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travel and the use of taxpayer money.121  Congress has also behaved similar-
ly.122  This section will focus on Florida and federal legislation related to 
Cuba. 
1. State Action 
Florida has consistently implemented legislation affecting Cuba, much 
of which has been upheld.123  This becomes clear when one looks at the 
number of court opinions in federal courts over the past decade.124  In Facul-
ty Senate of Florida International University v. Winn,125 the Eleventh Circuit 
held that a state law directing universities not to use state funds for travel to 
Cuba was constitutional and not preempted by federal law.126  In Faculty 
Senate of Florida International University, the court distinguished the case 
from Crosby by reasoning that the Florida law at issue only placed restric-
tions on taxpayer dollars and not on individuals or companies trying to travel 
or trade.127  The court concluded that states have a reasonable amount of dis-
cretion in deciding how to spend taxpayer money in education programs.128
In 2008, a federal judge for the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida issued an order enjoining a state representative 
from enforcing a Florida law affecting businesses providing travel to Cuba.129
The court reasoned that because the federal government had demonstrated 
intent to occupy the field, the Florida law was likely preempted.130  Eight 
years earlier, the same court issued a preliminary injunction barring en-
forcement of a law very similar to the Cuba Amendment, which is a main 
 121. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 n.3 (citing Faculty Senate of 
Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 25, 2012); ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 
1280 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 
(S.D. Fla. 2000)). 
 122. See id. at *2–4. 
 123. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 n.3 (citing Faculty Senate of 
Fla. Int’l Univ., 616 F.3d at 1207; ABC Charters, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1280; Miami Light 
Project, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1176). 
 124. See id.
 125. 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. 
June 25, 2012). 
 126. Id. at 1207–08, 1212. 
 127. Id. at 1209–10 (distinguishing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
378–79 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 128. Id. at 1208, 1210–11. 
 129. ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280–81, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 
2008). 
 130. Id. at 1304. 
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focus of this article.131  The law was signed by Governor Scott in 2012 and is 
the most recent anti-Cuba legislation from Florida.132
2. Federal Action 
The federal government has also been fairly active in enacting legisla-
tion imposing sanctions on Cuba.133  Many of these regulations are highly 
relevant to the recent litigation regarding the Cuba Amendment, and are dis-
cussed by the federal court in Florida, where litigation recently occurred.134
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations—passed in 1963—are a set of federal 
regulations that generally limit exports, imports, and travel by United States 
persons and entities to Cuba.135  Almost thirty years later, the federal gov-
ernment enacted the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) as a reaction to Cuba’s 
“consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights 
and . . . democratic values.”136  The CDA provided significant discretion to 
the President, allowing him “to waive the sanctions imposed by the CDA 
should [he] determine that the Cuban government has taken action consistent 
with the promotion of democracy as specifically delineated by the CDA.”137
In 1996, the federal government passed another act “after the Cuban 
government downed two private planes [with] anti-Castro Cuban-Americans 
[onboard].”138  The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act 
of 1996 contains four titles authorizing the President and others to take cer-
tain action.139  The first title authorizes “the President to oppose Cuba[’s] 
 131. Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (S.D. Fla. 
2000).  The law at issue in this case contained several restrictions including prohibiting the 
county of Miami-Dade from entering into business contracts with companies that had done 
business with Cuba.  Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2) (2012). 
 132. Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012); see also FLA. STAT. § 287.135. 
 133. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2–4; see, e.g., Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208 (2011). 
 134. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5; see also FLA. STAT. § 
287.135. 
 135. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208, .560.  This federal law generally places limitations on 
persons inside the United States and their ability to transact for credit, gold or silver, or import 
merchandise that has been made in Cuba, been transported through Cuba, or made from ma-
terial produced or grown in Cuba.  31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208. 
 136. Cuban Democracy Act of 1922, 22 U.S.C. § 6001(1) (2006); see also 31 C.F.R. § 
515.201. 
 137. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a)). 
 138. Id. at *3 (citing Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 
U.S.C. § 6046(a)(7)–(8) (2006); Tim Weiner, Clinton Considers Punishing Cubans for Plane 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A1). 
 139. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91). 
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membership [in] various international organizations and institutions.”140  The 
second title authorizes the President to consult with Congress and provide 
assistance in the event a democratic government is established in Cuba.141
The third title creates a right of action against people who traffic property 
confiscated from United States citizens or businesses by the Cuban govern-
ment.142  The final title 
excludes from the United States . . . any alien who “traffics in con-
fiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States na-
tional,” or any “corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in the 
confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated property, a 
claim to which is owned by a United States national.”143
The third section was initially controversial on the world stage because it 
affects foreign countries.144  However, this situation was diffused when Pres-
ident Clinton exercised the section’s waiver provision that is to be used 
whenever “the President determine[s] ‘the suspension is necessary to the 
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to de-
mocracy in Cuba.’”145  To date, every successive President has invoked the 
waiver provision meaning that section three has never legally been in ef-
fect.146
The final piece of federal legislation at issue in recent litigation relating 
to Cuba, and that this article will briefly mention, is the Trade Sanctions 
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.147  This Act actually loosened 
sanctions on Cuba relating to agriculture, medicine, and medical devices.148
Specifically, this law makes exceptions so that agricultural products and 
medical devices may be free of sanctions limiting their “provision or use.”149
The Obama Administration has also lowered restrictions, allowing religious 
 140. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–46). 
 141. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061–67). 
 142. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *3 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–85). 
 143. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a)(2)–(3)). 
 144. Id. (citing Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Warns U.S. on Law Penalizing Cuba Com-
merce, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996, at D6). 
 145. Id. at *5 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)(1)). 
 146. Id.
 147. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6 (citing Trade Sanctions Reform & 
Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201–09 (2006)). 
 148. Id. at *4; see also 22 U.S.C. §§ 7202, 7203(2)(A)–(C), 7204, 7205(a)(1)–(2), 
7207(b)(1), 7208–09(a). 
 149. 22 U.S.C. § 7203(2). 
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individuals to travel to Cuba from the United States;150 perhaps an indication 
of sanctions becoming more and more lenient. 
B. The Florida Law 
The next part of this article will proceed by discussing the Cuba 
Amendment in more specificity while focusing on the most recent federal 
court order barring its enforcement because of the law’s questionable consti-
tutionality.  This discussion will include comparisons and analogies to the 
Massachusetts law and relevant constitutional issues raised by the Crosby
decision.  There will also be a brief analysis of the political aspect of the 
Cuba Amendment. 
1. Odebrecht Construction, Inc. v. Prasad
The plaintiff in this recent legal suit argued that the Cuba Amendment is 
unconstitutional for many of the same reasons the Massachusetts law was 
found unconstitutional.151  Odebrecht Construction, the plaintiff, is a contrac-
tor headquartered in Coral Gables with a parent company in Brazil.152  Ode-
brecht was founded in 1990 and has a close history with the State of Florida 
and local governments throughout.153  Perhaps the most recent relationship is 
the plaintiff’s contract with Broward County to refurbish Fort Lauderdale 
International Airport, a contract worth over two hundred million dollars.154
The plaintiff’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A., is headquartered in 
Brazil and conducts business on almost every continent.155  It is actually 
another company owned by parent Odebrecht S.A., COI Overseas, that has 
given rise to the current controversy for the Coral Gables based subsidiary.156
COI Overseas Ltd. is currently contracting with Cuba and working on the 
Port of Mariel.157  As signs of the project’s significance to Brazil, a major 
 150. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *4 (citing MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 31139, CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES 4–6 
(2011)). 
 151. Id. at *1, *4–5 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74, 
376, 379–81 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 
1999)). 
 152. Id. at *1 (quoting Amended Complaint at 6, Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 
12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 4). 
 153. Id.
 154. Id.
 155. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *1 (citing Amended Complaint, supra
note 152, at 6). 
 156. Id.
 157. Id.
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bank in the country is providing financing and “President Dilma Rousseff 
[recently] traveled to the Port of Mariel to view [its] progress.”158
The defendant in the suit was the Secretary of the Florida Department of 
Transportation, Ananth Prasad, as it is his duty to administer the Cuba 
Amendment.159  However, this discussion will refer generally to the State of 
Florida as the defendant. 
In the opinion following the order granting a preliminary injunction, the 
court analyzed the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in its argument that the 
law is unconstitutional.160  Judge K. Michael Moore of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida discussed the Supremacy 
Clause and whether the Cuba Amendment is preempted by federal legisla-
tion.161  In the opinion following the order, Judge Moore noted the Massa-
chusetts law, discussed earlier, and the reasons a unanimous Supreme Court 
found the law unconstitutional—namely, that the Massachusetts law inter-
fered with the President’s discretion, was broader in scope than the federal 
law, and conflicted with a directive issued to the President by Congress.162
Judge Moore went on to state that “the Cuba Amendment suffers from the 
same shortcomings and . . . is likely unconstitutional.”163
a. Preemption 
The first reason Judge Moore doubted the constitutionality of the Cuba 
Amendment is it directly interferes with Presidential discretion under the 
CDA and is likely preempted.164  As the sole representative of the United 
States on the world stage, the President has the discretion to waive sanctions 
placed on Cuba by way of the CDA, should Cuba go through a political 
reform and construct a democratic government.165  Judge Moore also noted 
the controversial aspect of the Libertad Act and the fact that every President 
has waived enforcement of the right of action provision; thereby evidencing 
congressional intent not to punish foreign entities with business contracts in 
 158. Id.
 159. Id. at *2. 
 160. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *4–7, *9. 
 161. Id. at *4–7. 
 162. Id. at *5 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74, 381
(2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 163. Id. at *5. 
 164. Id. (citing Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–74); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 
6007 (2006). 
 165. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6007). 
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Cuba.166  Alternatively, the Cuba Amendment forces businesses “to choose 
between doing business with Florida [or] Cuba.”167
Next, Judge Moore noted that the Cuba Amendment goes further than 
federal sanctions on Cuba because of the fact that companies located in the 
United States suffer merely because of the relationships maintained by their 
corporate owners.168  The Cuba Amendment also imposes greater penalties 
than federal legislation in that offenders may be required to pay civil fines 
and are banned from making a bid to the State of Florida for three years after 
violating the law.169
Lastly, “the Cuba Amendment interferes with the President’s directive 
under the Libertad Act” to work at establishing a democratic government in 
Cuba.170  Judge Moore, quoting Justice Souter in Crosby, stated that the Pres-
ident should be able to work on the world stage and use his power to “‘bar-
gain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without excep-
tion for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics.’”171
Judge Moore characterized this effect as a diminishment in the President’s 
bargaining power in the realm of foreign policy.172
Judge Moore next criticized Florida’s counterarguments starting with 
the first that the Cuba Amendment is not preempted because federal law does 
not prohibit any of its terms.173  However, this is contrary to Crosby where 
Justice Souter noted that “‘[s]anctions are drawn not only to bar what they 
prohibit but to allow what they permit, and the inconsistency of sanctions 
here undermines the congressional calibration of force.’”174  This is one of 
the reasons that the Massachusetts law was preempted.175  Florida’s argument 
that the President lacks broad discretion to adjust Cuba sanctions was re-
 166. Id. (citing Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 
U.S.C. § 6085 (2006)). 
 167. Id.
 168. Id. at *8. 
 169. Id. at *6.
 170. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6; see also 22 U.S.C. § 
6062(b)(2)(A). 
 171. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 
F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)).
 172. Id.
 173. Id. at *6–7. 
 174. Id. at *6 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380). 
 175. Id. at *5.  “The federal sanctions imposed direct sanctions on Burma, vested the 
President with the power to impose further sanctions subject to certain conditions, and di-
rected the President to develop a multilateral strategy to foster democracy and improve human 
rights in Burma.”  Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5 (citing Crosby, 530 U.S. 
at 368–69). 
19
McGlynn: Venturing Where Others Have Failed with Anti-Cuba Law: Florida Fi
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
174 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
jected as flatly wrong by Judge Moore, who noted that for years Presidents 
have exercised considerable discretion in this area.176  Finally, Judge Moore 
stated that Florida is wrong in arguing that the case is not ripe in that no 
complaint has been lodged with the World Trade Organization, because the 
court need not wait for such a complaint in order to invoke a preliminary 
injunction against a law that is likely preempted.177
In his analysis, Judge Moore discussed the various ways in which the 
Cuba Amendment clashes with federal law.178  Responding to Florida’s ar-
gument that there is no conflict, Judge Moore clearly stated that “[f]ederal 
law regulates all aspects of commerce with Cuba, including but not limited to 
the importation and exportation of various goods and services, travel be-
tween the United States and Cuba, and private rights of action against the 
Cuban government.”179  This demonstrates a clear congressional intent to 
occupy the field, and therefore, casts serious doubt on the constitutionality of 
the Cuba Amendment.180  In Faculty Senate of Florida International Univer-
sity mentioned earlier, the Eleventh Circuit found that a Florida law limiting 
state money from being used by state universities for travel to Cuba was not 
preempted.181  Judge Moore distinguished this case by noting that the law at 
issue in Faculty Senate of Florida International University did not prohibit 
trading by anyone, while the Cuba Amendment obviously is intended to re-
duce trade.182
b. Federal Foreign Affairs Power 
Judge Moore’s order next discussed the Cuba Amendment in light of 
the federal government’s foreign affairs power.183  The American system of 
governance necessitates that the federal government reign over all foreign 
affairs so that the states themselves do not become involved in foreign affairs 
potentially at the expense of other states.184  Judge Moore noted Zschernig,
 176. See id. at *6; Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6007 (2006); Cuban Liber-
ty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6085 (2006). 
 177. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6. 
 178. Id. at *5–6. 
 179. Id. at *7 (citing ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1304 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008)). 
 180. Id. at *7. 
 181. Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1207–08, 1212 (11th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
 182. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *7 (quoting Faculty Senate of Fla. 
Int’l Univ., 616 F.3d at 1210); see also FLA. STAT. § 287.135 (2012). 
 183. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *7. 
 184. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941). 
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where the Supreme Court held that state laws that interfere with the federal 
government’s foreign affairs power may cause “‘disruption or embarrass-
ment.’”185  The Zschernig court also noted that a state law must have more 
than an “‘incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries’” in order to cross 
the line into the federal government’s jurisdiction.186  The test a court must 
employ to determine whether a state law has this effect was formulated in the 
familiar Natsios opinion.187  These factors include the state law’s intent, ef-
fects on purchasing power, effects on other states’ decisions to implement 
similar legislation, international reaction, and the difference when compared 
to federal law.188
However, Judge Moore declined to apply this test and instead merely 
stated that it was enough that the Cuba Amendment is probably unconstitu-
tional in that it clashes with Zschernig because of the impact on foreign 
countries that trade with Cuba and Florida, such as Brazil and Canada.189
Thus far, several countries have already voiced concern over the Cuba 
Amendment because of how it affects them.190  It is for these reasons that 
Judge Moore believed the Cuba Amendment unconstitutionally delved into 
the federal government’s foreign affairs power.191  Although not addressed 
directly by the Supreme Court, the First Circuit employed similar reasoning 
when examining the Massachusetts law under the federal government’s for-
eign affairs power.192
c. Commerce Clause 
The final constitutional analysis undertaken by Judge Moore related to 
the Commerce Clause located in Article I of the Constitution.193  The federal 
government has the power “to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign [n]ations’” 
and the Supreme Court has acknowledged a negative implication, namely the 
 185. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *7 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 434–35 (1968)). 
 186. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)). 
 187. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir.), cert. granted,
528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 188. Id.
 189. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *8; see also Zschernig, 389 U.S. 
at 434–35; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53. 
 190. Mazzei, Miami Federal Judge Blocks New Florida Anti-Cuba Law, supra note 10.  
Canada and Brazil are two of Florida’s largest trading partners.  Id.
 191. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *8, *12.
 192. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 49. 
 193. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
3. 
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Dormant Commerce Clause.194  Judge Moore noted the importance of the 
Commerce Clause in that when conducting trade with foreign nations “‘the 
people of the United States act through a single government.’”195  Quoting 
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,196 Judge Moore stated “the Su-
preme Court held that a state law violates the Foreign Commerce Clause 
when it ‘impair[s] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is 
essential,’ and ‘prevents this Nation from “speaking with one voice” in regu-
lating foreign trade.’”197  Judge Moore stated this to express that the Foreign 
Commerce Clause is a greater power for the federal government than the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.198  The Court in Japan Line, Ltd. noted that a 
state law will violate the Foreign Commerce Clause if it clashes with a feder-
al law and causes the United States to be heard speaking with more than 
“‘one voice’” in dealing with foreign policy.199
Next, Judge Moore stated the reasons that the Cuba Amendment possi-
bly violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.200  Describing the law as facially 
discriminatory because the law discriminates against entities doing business 
with Cuba by its very terms, Judge Moore noted how international compa-
nies and countries that conduct legitimate business with Cuba are prohibited 
by Florida from doing business with it.201  The effect on the federal govern-
ment’s power to conduct foreign economic activity is obvious according to 
Judge Moore, who drew parallels between the Cuba Amendment and the 
Massachusetts law in that they both “impede[] the federal government’s abil-
ity to speak with one voice in regulating foreign trade.”202  Further, Judge 
Moore expressed that there is no justification for the Cuba Amendment be-
cause the regulatory mechanism of the federal government is already in ef-
fect.203
 194. Quill Corp. v. N.D. ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
 195. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. 
of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). 
 196. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
 197. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd., 441 
U.S. at 448, 452). 
 198. See id. at *9–10 (citing Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448). 
 199. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 
276, 285 (1976)). 
 200. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9–10. 
 201. Id. at *9. 
 202. Id. (citing Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash, supra note 6); see also
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 69 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 
1018 (1999). 
 203. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *11. 
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The State of Florida responded to the initial suit by arguing that the Cu-
ba Amendment is a legitimate exercise of the state’s power under the market 
participant exception, relying on Supreme Court precedent.204  Florida argued 
that as an actor in the market, it could choose not to do business with compa-
nies linked to Cuba based on this exception.205  Judge Moore disagreed and 
explained that while the exception may be applicable, the Cuba Amendment 
would not be subject to it for the reason that it markedly affects companies 
outside of Florida’s market.206  Because the law has this effect on companies 
outside of Florida, namely those doing business with Cuba, the Cuba 
Amendment constitutes Florida regulating downstream activity, which it may 
not do under the market participant exception.207  Similarly, a federal court 
found that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional under the market par-
ticipant exception for comparable reasons.208
d. Political Facet 
Florida’s decision to pass the Cuba Amendment also entails a delicate 
political balancing act with the South Florida Cuban exile community on one 
hand, and foreign countries and companies with business interests in the state 
on the other.209  Odebrecht, the subsidiary of a large Brazilian corporation,210
could lose hundreds of millions of dollars in business if the courts ultimately 
uphold the law.211  The fact that the Cuba Amendment will essentially punish 
Brazilian company Odebrecht for its ties to Cuba is especially awkward con-
sidering the fact that tourists from that country make up one of the largest 
 204. Id. at *10 (citing Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 14–15, Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 
2012 WL 2524261 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 15); see White v. Mass. Council of 
Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206–07 (1983). 
 205. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *10 (citing Defendant’s Memo-
randum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 204, at 14–
15); see also Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. at 206–07. 
 206. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *10. 
 207. Id.; see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 820–21 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 
185 (1938)). 
 208. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62–63 (1st Cir.), cert. granted,
528 U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 209. See Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash, supra note 6. 
 210. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524262, at *1 (citing Amended Complaint, supra
note 152, at 6). 
 211. Doreen Hemlock, Congress Considers Ban on U.S. Military Contracts for Companies 
Doing Business in Cuba, MCCLATCHY-TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Wash.), July 11, 2012. 
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groups of Florida visitors.212  Florida Governor Scott even traveled to Brazil 
in early 2012 to encourage trade.213  Canada has also complained about the 
Cuba Amendment because of concerns for Canadian companies that operate 
in Florida and Cuba.214  However, the law has garnered considerable support 
in parts of Florida, such as heavily populated Cuban areas like Hialeah.215
When the legislation was still being considered, there was very little opposi-
tion to Miami lawmakers who favored it.216
However, not everyone who is anti-Cuba approves of the law or be-
lieves that it will be effective.217  Generally, pro-business organizations, like 
the Florida Chamber of Commerce, have criticized the new law.218  Some 
believe that the law will help bolster the Cuban government by creating 
sympathy for a regime that many detest.219  Despite the law’s controversy, 
Florida expressed an intent not to retreat and has recently announced that it 
will be appealing Judge Moore’s order.220  The State of Florida has expressed 
interest in having the Eleventh Circuit overrule Judge Moore.221
e. Other Concerns 
It is worth briefly mentioning some other issues that are raised by the 
Cuba Amendment.  Relating specifically to Odebrecht, but potentially affect-
ing other entities, is the issue of injury.222  Because of the constitutional bar 
against states being sued for money damages, Odebrecht would have virtual-
ly no way of recovering its substantial losses caused by the law’s enforce-
ment.223  In fact, the losses to Odebrecht alone would be almost four billion 
 212. See id.; Paul Graham, Portals and Rails, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA (Aug. 13, 
2012), http://portalsandrails.frbatlanta.org/2012/08/tourism-traffic-boosts-prepaid-cards.html. 
 213. Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash, supra note 6. 
 214. Id.
 215. See id.
 216. See id.
 217. See, e.g., Andres Oppenheimer, Florida Law Against Cuba May Help Cuba, MIAMI 
HERALD, May 2, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/05/02/v-print/2780050/florida-law-
against-cuba-may-help.html.  The Dean of Saint Thomas University School of Business called 
the Cuba Amendment “a black eye on Florida” because of his belief that the law is unconstitu-
tional.  Id.
 218. Id.
 219. See id.
 220. Fla. Appeals Ruling Blocking Cuba Contracts Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25, 
2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/fla-appeals-ruling-blocking-cuba-
145338038.html;_ylt=A2kJNTteCBQTEMA48L_wgt. 
 221. See id.
 222. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at 
*11 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). 
 223. See id.
24
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dollars.224  If the Cuba Amendment is fully enforced, companies doing busi-
ness with Cuba—as well as the State of Florida—may lose a substantial sum, 
seeing that contracts that have already been negotiated will have to be aban-
doned and the state may be forced to contract with companies that cost 
more.225
2. Lessons and Implications from Crosby
One thing to be noted about the Crosby opinion is that it was unanim-
ous.226  While the members of the Court today are different than in 2000, five 
of the Justices are still serving.227  Provided the similarities between the two 
laws, it seems improbable that any of the five Justices would change their 
minds.  However, it is not impossible that new members could be appointed 
before and if Odebrecht advances that far.228
IV. CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts law and the Florida Cuba Amendment have many 
common provisions.229  Both laws have targeted an unpopular regime and 
attempted to put pressure on that government by way of economic sanctions, 
whereby the state enacting the legislation refuses to contract with entities 
associated with the country targeted by the law.230  While the First Circuit did 
not hesitate to call the Massachusetts law unconstitutional for a variety of 
reasons,231 the Supreme Court was very specific that it was striking it down 
on the basis that federal law preempted it.232
It is uncertain whether the Cuba Amendment will advance to the Su-
preme Court like the Massachusetts Law.  However, if the law does advance 
 224. Id. at *11 n.13. 
 225. See, e.g., id. at *11. 
 226. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 750–51. 
 227. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 228. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, An Aging Court Raises the Stakes of the Presidential Elec-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at A18. 
 229. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5. 
 230. See FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2), (5) (2012); Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS.
ACTS 239, 239–43 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–7:22M, 40 F1/2 (1997)), declared 
unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 231. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 77 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 
U.S. 1018 (1999). 
 232. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 750–51. 
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to the Supreme Court, the Court’s opinion in Crosby should be a strong indi-
cator of the likely result.233
The future of Cuba’s government is also uncertain, given its aging lead-
er.  President Raul Castro recently announced that his government might 
even be willing to talk with the United States about plans for the future.234  If 
the two governments formally meet, it would be the first time in fifty 
years.235  However, given the Obama Administration’s less contentious atti-
tude towards Cuba, it appears that the present time is about as good as any in 
the past fifty years for the two countries to make amends.236  Of course Flori-
da’s Cuba Amendment has done little to help the two countries move for-
ward, and the state government may pose an obstacle to this occurring.237
 233. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386–88 (2000), aff’g Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 234. Peter Orsi, Raul Castro:  Cuba Willing to Sit Down with US, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 
28, 2012. 
 235. Id.
 236. See Odebrecht Constr. Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at 
*4 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). 
 237. See Caputo & Mazzei, supra note 5. 
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